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Shortly after the end of the Kosovo war, the last of the Yugoslav dissolution wars, the
Balkan Reconstruction Observatory was set up jointly by the Hellenic Observatory, the
Centre for the Study of Global Governance, both institutes at the London School of
Economics (LSE), and the Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies (wiiw).
A brainstorming meeting on Reconstruction and Regional Co-operation in the Balkans
was held in Vouliagmeni on 8-10  July 1999, covering the issues of security,
democratisation, economic reconstruction and the role of civil society. It was attended
by academics and policy makers from all the countries in the region, from a number of
EU countries, from the European Commission, the USA and Russia. Based on ideas and
discussions generated at this meeting, a policy paper on Balkan Reconstruction and
European Integration was the product of a collaborative effort by the two LSE institutes
and the wiiw. The paper was presented at a follow-up meeting on Reconstruction and
Integration in Southeast Europe in Vienna on 12-13 November 1999, which focused on
the economic aspects of the process of reconstruction in the Balkans. It is this policy
paper that became the very first Working Paper of the wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series. The Working Papers are published online at www.balkan-
observatory.net, the internet portal of the wiiw Balkan Observatory. It is a portal for
research and communication in relation to economic developments in Southeast Europe
maintained by the wiiw since 1999. Since 2000 it also serves as a forum for the Global
Development Network Southeast Europe (GDN-SEE) project, which is based on an
initiative by The World Bank with financial support from the Austrian Ministry of
Finance and the Oesterreichische Nationalbank. The purpose of the GDN-SEE project
is the creation of research networks throughout Southeast Europe in order to enhance
the economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to build new research capacities by
mobilising young researchers, to promote knowledge transfer into the region, to
facilitate networking between researchers within the region, and to assist in securing
knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. The wiiw Balkan Observatory
Working Papers series is one way to achieve these objectives. 
The wiiw Balkan Observatory Global Development Network 
Southeast Europe 
This study has been developed in the framework of research networks initiated and monitored by wiiw
under the premises of the GDN–SEE partnership. 
 
 
The Global Development Network, initiated by The World Bank, is a global network of
research and policy institutes working together to address the problems of national and
regional development. It promotes the generation of local knowledge in developing and
transition countries and aims at building research capacities in the different regions.  
 
The Vienna Institute for International Economic Studies is a GDN Partner Institute and
acts as a hub for Southeast Europe. The GDN–wiiw partnership aims to support the
enhancement of economic research capacity in Southeast Europe, to promote
knowledge transfer to SEE, to facilitate networking among researchers within SEE and
to assist in securing knowledge transfer from researchers to policy makers. 
 
The GDN–SEE programme is financed by the Global Development Network, the
Austrian Ministry of Finance and the Jubiläumsfonds der Oesterreichischen
Nationalbank.  
 
For additional information see www.balkan-observatory.net, www.wiiw.ac.at and
www.gdnet.org 
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In this study we perform the first econometric attempt to estimate the trade-off 
between equity and efficiency of tax systems counting for the tax evasion option in a 
developing country such as Albania. Using the Albanian Living Srandard Measurement 
Survey (2005, 2008) we estimate a micro-econometric model of labour supply and 
incorporate the option of participation in regular and irregular labour markets.  Swapping 
the tax rules of 2005 with 2008, we find that the flat tax has not contributed in the reduction 
of labour informality but rather the increases in regular wages have played an important 
role in convincing the individuals to move to regular market. Furthermore, we find that 
controls and audits are more efficient than fines in inducing people to switch from the 
informal to formal labour market. A similar effect is achieved also when “honest” 
individuals are endowed with a universal benefit. In distributional terms, calculations of 
Gini inequality index and Sen’s welfare index demonstrate that the only scenario that 
would improve welfare index is a progressive tax rule as before 2007. Finally, these results 
suggest that a kind of progressivity should be reinserted to the taxation system without 
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1.  Background information and literature review 
The literature on transition economies and the relationship between income 
inequality and size of informal economy has demonstrated that there exists a positive 
causality between these two. The experience of 16 transition economies proved that a 
raising share of output produced in the informal economy leads to a decline of tax revenues 
and a weaker welfare system and consequently to an increase of income inequality, which 
from its side could lead to more informal activities as social solidarity falls short, Rosser 
(2000). Similar conclusions were drawn also from the study of Pirttilä (1999) which argued 
that the high level of inequality and the weak public support increase the incentives for tax 
evasion.  
The research in high-income countries has shown that labour income taxes might 
stimulate activities in the informal labour market and consequently generate undeclared 
income and evaded taxes, Smith( 2001). In addition, the theory of tax evasion sustains that 
the individuals supply labour to the informal labour market either because regulations 
constrain their labour supply or because they are unemployed, Sandmo (2004). The 
research in low-income countries, has shown that tax evasion in transition economies is 
quite a widespread phenomenon and its implications to the growth and efficiency of the 
fiscal system are serious, Schneider(2010). However, in low-income countries and 
transition economies the informal employment could be a forced choice driven by the 
limited access to formal employment, social exclusion and labour market segmentation.  
The study of Cichocki (2009) on informal employment in transition economies, raising the 
questions whether this decision was a matter of choice, found that the employment in the 
informal labour market was more prevalent among low-income earners compared to their 
counterparts.  
The intervention of the governments to reduce the informal employment especially 
through changes in the tax regime has demonstrated that the change in the tax and social 
welfare system will have a significant effect especially among low-income earners. Fortin  
et al(1994). However, in transition economies the intervention of the governments to reduce 
tax evasion and increase the efficiency of the tax regime are limited to a certain extent 
because of the high level of corruption and its positive relationship with tax evasion.   4
Schneider (2007, 2009) showed that low-income countries suffer from a high level of 
shadow economy and corruption, which complements each other. 
In the context of Albania the phenomenon of informal economy is sizeable, crucial 
and somewhat uncertain. In one side it contributes to provide many individuals, in some 
way, with employment alternatives and poverty alleviation possibilities while on the other 
side, a large informal sector implies unfair competition for registered businesses and low 
tax revenues (IMF, 2003). Schneider (2010) shows that the average size of the shadow 
economy of Albania increased from 34.7% official GDP in 1999 to and increased to 38% in 
2006 which is an increase of more than 3 percentage points over these six years. In 
addition, Schneider et al (2009) show that in low-income countries, including Albania, the 
shadow economy activities and corruption reinforce each other meaning that there exists a 
positive relationship between these two. The realization of additional income through 
underground activities is reached via corruption of public officials that get seduced by the 
benefits received from permitting the exercise of such activities. 
4 
The example of Albania, having a size of informal economy, which at macro level 
ranges from 33-60% of GDP (Muco, 2004), along with the application of one of the lowest 
flat taxes, only at 10 %, provides an interesting experimental laboratory of analyzing the 
implications of the tax system on inequality and informal labour market. Other studies as 
well, argue that the shadow economy absorbs a good share of GDP, OECD (2005). In 
particular, the informal production in small enterprises is 40% larger than the formal one 
while enterprises underreport  more than 30% of their employees.
5 At micro level, the 
underpay of wages along with non-contribution to social security system is a widespread 
and socially acceptable phenomenon both by employees and employers. The fuzzy labor 
market and, weak support of the welfare system induce employers and employees to choose 
illicit solutions. Thus, such choices are not motivated by the purpose of getting higher 
profits through undocumented activities, remaining in the business and bring more 
consumable income at home at the end of the day, OECD (2005). The conclusion of the 
OECD study was that under these conditions, the passivity of the government in 
undertaking fiscal reforms and actions of fighting tax evasion, would result to a continuous 
                                                            
4 See in the Annex Figure.1 and Figure.2 on the GDP growth and share of shadow economy on GDP between 
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5 OECD (2005) The Informal Economy in Albania Analysis and policy recommendations. December 2004   5
decline of tax revenues, less investments, less formal employment, less social security 
contributions and lower social benefits.  
Consequently, the reaction of the Albanian government by introducing a low tax 
regime of 10 percent rate was first making Albania more attractive to foreign investors, by 
radically reducing the fiscal burden on business income tax, and secondly increasing 
incentives to regular employment, income declaration and social security contributions 
because of a sharp reduction on personal income tax burden. Under the new tax regime 
implemented since July 2007 the personal income is taxed at a rate of 10% while income 
under 10000 leke is tax exempted.
6 The application of a low flat tax is supposed to 
encourage the legalization of the informal employment, simplification of the tax collection 
and creation of a friendlier investment climate. Its implementations have important effects 
both for the employers and employees hence is worthy experimenting how flat tax could 
contribute to reduce the irregular employment and consequently increase tax revenues for 
the government in Albania. Holzner (2008) predicted that the flat tax will not achieve the 
expected desirable effects. In contrary its impact is anticipated by a decrease of tax 
revenues and an increase of income inequality in Albania.  
Therefore, the purpose of this research is to study the individual labour supply in 
Albania by applying a micro-simulation model, which allows counting for both, formal and 
informal employment. One hypothesis concerning the tax regimes is that progressive 
taxation is designed to collect a greater proportion of income from the rich relative to the 
poor, reducing in this way the inequality of disposable income relative to taxable income. 
Governments, which introduce flat taxes and reduce the progressivity of tax rates may 
induce especially low income earners to reduce taxable income by either working less in 
the formal labor market or declaring less earning income. The informal employment in 
transition countries, considered as a safety net in the short run, in the long run has strong 
consequences with respect to the poverty risk due to the non-participation and non-
contribution to the social security system. For our purpose of research, we focused on the 
implications of a flat tax regime to inequality and individuals decision to undertake 
irregular activities in the labour market. Motivated by the arguments above, the hypotheses 
that this research tried to answer are:  
                                                            
6 Agenda Istitute in Albania provides a comprehensive policy brief concerning the flat tax in Albania. 
The Craggy Flat-Tax Reform- Agenda Institute Policy Brief-nr 4. 
http://www.agendainstitute.org/img/foto/agenda_policy%20brief_nr.4_en.pdf 
   6
•  Does the application of a low flat tax constitute an appropriate tax regime, 
which contributes to the reduction of inequality? 
•  Does the application of a low flat tax in the transition countries, with high 
level of informal economy, provide incentives to increase the formal sector 
and regular employment? 
•  Which fiscal policies may be efficient in reducing labour informality?  
 
Answering to these questions has important policy implications, since understanding 
better the mechanism of individual behavior in labor market will help to remove 
disincentives related to tax evasion as well as to design a tax system that lessen inequality. 
Hence, this study contributes with new empirical evidence that enriches the understanding 
of the flat tax system efficiency and the causality between inequality and tax evasion. 
The paper is organized as following: section two presents the main hypothesis of 
introducing a flat tax in Albania, section three presents the main methodology and data 
used in the analysis; section four presents the specifications and simulations of alternative 
options aiming to reduce tax evasion; section five presents the main estimation results and 
the main findings from the simulations and the last section presents the conclusions and the 
respective policy implications. 
 
2.  The experiment of flat tax in transition economies and the case of Albania 
 
The interlink between labor supply decisions and taxation systems and the way of 
how to bring down the informal economy are quite debated in the literature. Choosing 
between progressive and flat tax systems is a crucial issue and the consequences of the 
respective tax regimes have to be examined in details counting for participation and hours 
of work both in the formal and informal labor market.
7 The focus at these segments of the 
labor market, is motivated by the fact that efficiency of reforms in the tax system depend on 
the response of honest labor suppliers as well as evaders, their behavior in relation to tax 
evasion especially of the last ones. 
 
                                                            
7 The extensive margin implies the change of participation in the labour market, regular and irregular one, 
while intensive margin implies changes in hours of work.    7
The implementation of relatively low tax regimes is also related to the issue of 
whether it taxes more at the top or at the bottom of income distribution. To avoid large 
negative effects on the intensive margin (hours of work), the increase of tax rates at the top 
of the distribution is often not recommended. On the other side, to avoid large negative 
effects on the extensive margin (participation decision) it is suggested not to increase taxes 
at the bottom of the distribution. The overall effect of switching from progressive to flat 
taxes could result to lower marginal tax rates for the high-income deciles and increased 
average tax rates for the low-income deciles. Thus, inducing low-income earners to 
increase their participation in the formal labor market and to switch from informal to formal 
one is a challenge for the tax system. Moreover, the accomplishment of a reform should be 
put forward in combination to other reforms such as welfare reforms aiming to reduce the 
inequality and increase the utility of the individual
8. 
In most of the transition countries flat tax is the main fiscal instrument introduced 
with the purpose of simplifying the tax system, increasing the compliance and reducing tax 
evasion. The implementation of a flat tax system in transition economies of Central - 
Eastern European countries has produced diverse results. For example in Russia the 
application in 2001 of a flat tax at 13 percent on personal income, replacing the progressive 
tax rates of 20 and 30 percent was followed by a significant real growth in tax revenues. 
But as the study of Gorodnichenko (2008) shows in spite of a positive relationship between 
lower tax rates and lower tax evasion, the adoption of a flat tax was not the main cause of 
increase in the tax revenues. Furthermore, Schneider (2010) provide figures of an increase 
of informal economy in Russia between 2001 and 2006 from 46.0 to 46.4 percent.  
Brook, and Leibfritz (2005) studied the effect of flat tax adopted in Slovakia in 2003 
at a rate of 19 percent, both on capital and labour income. They demonstrated a significant 
and positive effect on economic performance of the country. The uniform and simplified 
taxation negatively affected tax evasion and the reduction in personal income tax resulted to 
an increase of compliance and stimulated a shift from the informal to the formal labour 
market. However, in spite of the reform in the fiscal system complemented with reforms in 
the welfare system, the overall effect was an increase of income inequality relative to the 
previous system. While the low and very high-income earners were better off in the new 
                                                            
8 Increased utility of the evader goes parallel to the decreased utility of the honest. Thus when aggregating 
profits and losses should the profit be equally qualified with the profits from other activities? There are no 
clear-cut answers and economic policies at this respect, while evading tax is an option and may produce 
efficiency gains to the economy (Sandmo 2004). Albeit this is partially true, by intuition, this reasoning fits 
better to economies in transition, which find the tax evasion as a transitional remedy.    8
system compared to the previous one, the middle-income earners were negatively affected 
by the new tax regime.  
With reference to the Albanian case, the purpose of the reform introduced in July 
2007 was to implement a similar tax regime, as the one in Macedonia and Bulgaria, at a rate 
of 10 percent. The application of the flat tax replaces various brackets of tax rates into a 
single level one and in case of individuals is implemented on personal income while in case 
of businesses is exercised on the business income. The flat tax implied a reduction of two 
taxes at the same level: the earning business tax and personal income tax. The profit 
business tax reduced from 20 to 10 % while the implementation of personal income tax at 
10% rate on diverse personal income was supposed to have an effect on all income deciles.  
The supporters of this new tax system argued that it would bring many benefits by 
encouraging foreign direct investment, increasing the economic activity that stimulates 
reporting of income which consequently leads to the reduction of tax evasion and informal 
economy. Other arguments pro the implementation of the flat tax are that it guarantees 
equality through the implementation of the same taxation level, reduces the chances for tax 
fraud, the increase in tax revenues and removal of disincentives to formal employment are 
very likely. However, opponents of such reform argue that this system reward businesses, 
high income earners and punish the poor. The arguments against the flat tax system are that 
by removing progressive taxation it encourages inequality for those who generate higher 
level of earnings and income, thus to a certain extent it eliminates the redistribution of 
income from the rich to the poor. With the abolition of a progressive tax system, lower and 
medium income earners may be charged a higher income tax and consequently have a 
lower level of disposal income and in contrast high income earners benefit from the 
reduction of income tax and end up with a higher level of disposal income.   
Moreover, the negative effect may be accentuated especially in those countries 
characterized by high unemployment rates where underpaid employment dominates due to 
the surplus of labor supply and shortage of labor demand. In complex, the exercise of a flat 
tax system may elevate social inequalities by lightening the fiscal burden for businesses 
rather than individuals. This issue is of vital concern as the augmentation of inequality 
could induce low and medium income earners to evade and not declare their employment 
status rather than paying higher income taxes. As it was found from the study of Rosser 
(2000 there exist a significant two-way relationship between the size of informal economy 
and income inequality. Furthermore Blomquist (2003, 2006) has shown that the adoption of   9
a flat tax system, which shifts more of the total tax burden onto low-income earners, may 
increase the evasion by this group of taxpayers.  
 
3.  Data Description  
In this study we use two waves of the Albanian Living Standard Measurement 
Survey (ALSMS), organized in 2005 and 2008 by the World Bank, which contain 
information about individuals and their households in different areas of Albania; 
information on variables such as hours of work, earnings and consumption level, social 
security contributions entitlements, information about social and demographic 
characteristics, such as gender, age, education, marital status, number of children, family 
composition, etc. Concerning the definition of informal economy several versions have 
been introduced which largely reflect the activity exercised in the informal sector. 
However, in our context the informal activity is considered the individual participation in 
informal labour market while tax evasion behavior and undeclared work to the tax 
authorities is captured through the ineligibility to the social security benefits. Thus the 
social-health insurance and personal income tax evasion is captured through the lack of 
access to the social security system while the individual supplies certain hours of work in 
the informal labour market. 
In this study, the criterion used to define the informal employment is based on the 
LSMS question addressed to individuals: are you entitled to social security benefits 
schemes?
9 A positive answer implies that those individuals are regular workers. To our 
knowledge, this is the only variable in the LSMS that can be considered as a proxy for the 
informal employment. We exclude from the sample individuals working in the agriculture 
sector and the self-employed on the grounds that the majority of them are involved in the 
irregular labour market. 
The Table 1 shows the demographic and economic characteristics of the sample 
both for regular and irregular workers in 2005 and 2008. The statistics indicate that while 
48% of the sample was not entitled to social security benefits in 2005, in 2008 this share 
reduced to 43%. Individuals holding a university degree evade less and this is in line with 
most of the empirical papers studying tax evasion issue. Also women tend to work less than 
men in the irregular market. If we consider the occupational sectors, there is an inverse shift 
                                                            
9 The criteria on labour status including undeclared work and its consequences such as lack of social benefits, 
sub-minimum wages and poor working conditions has been used by Harding and Jenkins (1989), Renooy 
(1990) and the International Labor Office to characterize informal sector.     10
of irregular workers from construction sector to manufacturing sector and this may be 
explained by the expansion of the latter during the period 2005-2008 (or contraction of the 
former). The last part of the descriptive Table 1 (related to monetary variables) shows the 
loss incurred by the government in terms of taxes and social security contributions by the 
informal employment phenomenon (or irregularity) which exceeds also the revenues 
collected from the regular workers in 2005. Despite their higher devotion in working hours, 
irregular workers earn less in average than the regular counterparts and what is more 
important there is an increase in the wage rate for regular workers and a decrease for 
irregular workers from 2005 to 2008.  
Table 1: Summary Statistics 
   2005  2008 








Observations  1548 1460 1500 1171 
Evasion Probability  48,54%  43,88% 
Male  57,04% 77,67% 57,00% 75,92% 
Age    41,56 39,71 42,27 40,69 
Education        
Primary  16,60% 42,05% 21,46% 47,56% 
Secondary  53,48% 50,00% 47,73% 45,60% 
University  29,78% 7,74% 30,66% 6,49% 
Occupation      
Construction  14,21% 32,81% 10,47% 18,19% 
Manufacture  11,82% 11,30% 15,60% 22,03% 
Trade+hotelling  3,42% 27,74% 5,40% 31,60% 
Transport+Services  9,37%  13,29% 14,87% 17,51% 
HS + Public + Health  61,18%  14,86%  53,66%  10,67% 
Monetary  Variables      
Wage  rate  149 142 200 138 
Gross  Income  28043 25771 34847 25600 
Taxes  1020 1261 3101 2713 
SIC  3140 3409 3902 3593 
Working  hours    43,77 48,94 43,19 48,66 
Note: Monetary variables are expressed in Albanian currency, Lek, and 
given on a monthly basis. In case of irregular workers taxes and sic mean 
evaded taxex and social insurance contributions.  
 
4.  The model specification 
The basic model is the one developed by Strøm et. al (2004) and Shima (2006), a 
labor supply model that focuses on the labour responses, both at participation and hours of 
work decision, in the formal and informal market, counting for the option of tax evasion.
 10 
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Different studies have emphasized diversities between labor supply responses on the 
extensive margin (participation) and intensive margin (hours worked) (Heckman, 1993). 
The literature consistently suggests that, for the low-income earners, the response at 
extensive margin is probably more important than the response at the intensive margin. 
However, a crucial drawback of these studies is that they ignore the attractiveness that the 
irregular labor market may inspire to individuals especially when the implicit tax rate, at the 
low end of the earnings distribution, is very large. Consequently, in contrast to these studies 
this research brings an innovative approach where the inclusion of informal employment, 
both at intensive and extensive margin, makes the difference and we can build a more 
realistic scenario of informality in the labour market. 
Our methodology consists in solving the problem of utility maximization including 
the option of tax evasion.
 11 Individuals consider after tax income as a good and hours 
offered in the labor market as a bad. Differently from other studies that maximize the utility 
function considering only the disposal income and leisure, we distinguish between income 
received by the formal and informal employment.  
We assume that an individual chooses simultaneously to work in the formal or 
informal labour market and the number of hours supplied under the principle of utility 
maximization. His decision is taken based on a range of variables such as wages, tax rates, 
norms and the opportunity to engage in informal employment. The opportunity to work in 
the informal labour market may depend on the working sector, e.g. it is considered easier to 
work irregularly in the construction sector rather than in the public sector. We model the 
individuals’ decision in two stages: 
 
1)  At stage 1, he chooses to be honest or evader. Here, the choice is determined in a 
way that if the expected consumer surplus of being an evader exceeds the 
consumer surplus of being honest by a certain threshold, then he chooses to 
evade. This threshold depends on the individual tax morale and the opportunities 
to evade. The higher is the individual tax morale and the fewer are the 
opportunities he faces for tax evasion, higher is this threshold.  
2)  At stage 2, he chooses the optimal labour supply and how many hours of work to 
supply in each market. The variables that help to explain his labour supply 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 
11 Option of tax evasion will be considered as the option of regular hours of work not declared to the tax 
authorities including also the option of non-participation in the tax and social security system.    12
choice are merely his net income, working sector and personal characteristics 
such as age, education and marital status. 
   It seems reasonable to us to believe that norms and opportunities to evade do not 
affect the individuals’ choice on how many hours to work in formal or informal market. 
Thus, we will assume that tax morale, norms and opportunities to evade effect the decision 
in the first stage but not in the second one. However in case of Albania, individuals do not 
consider the informal employment as an illegal activity. Instead it is his tax morale and the 
loss in future social security benefits that may affect his choice of working in the formal or 
informal labour market. Therefore from here on, we will not define an individual as honest 
or evader but rather as regular (R) and irregular (IR) worker.  
The individuals’ preferences to be a regular or irregular worker and supply a certain 
hours of work are not fully observed by us. There is a random component in individual 
behavior and we will derive the probability of each decision under a certain assumption 
made on the distribution of the random component. If we assume that the random errors are 
extreme value distributed, following Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1979) we can derive a closed 
form solution for the excepted value of the maximum utility, for both choices, that of being 
a formal or informal worker.   
Strøm et. al (2004) and Shima (2006) follow Alingham and Sandmo (1972) 
approach to allow the individuals to choose under uncertainty. But their method is based on 
the fact that tax evasion is a risky activity and there is a probability of detection for those 
who evade which consequently are penalized for the act of tax evasion. Studies have shown 
that in Albania the probability to get detected and penalized in case of tax evasion is 
extremely low (see OECD report, 2004).
12 In a scenario of unreported labour income and 
detection by the tax authorities  is only the employer who is warned and punished. 
Therefore, in this specification we deviate from the approach of Shima (2006) and use a 
simplified model.   
We start from stage two to explain the econometric model and more specifically the 
choice of optimal labour supply made by the individual in formal and informal market. 
 
Stage 2.a. : Labour supply of a regular worker 
 
                                                            
12 OECD (2005) “The informal economy in Albania: analysis and policy recommendations”.    13
   An individual after having chosen to work in the formal market has to choose the number 
of working hours that maximize his expected utility. Let  iR D  be his net income after paying 
taxes on personal income and let  iR h  be the annual working hours. We denote  iR w  the 
hourly wage rate for registered work and  iR G is gross wage income given as  iR R iR Gw h = . 
The variable I refers to other income and is considered as exogenous and C(.) is a tax 
function of wage income and non-wage income. The individuals’ net income is given as 
following:  
(1)     , ( ); 1,2,..., iR iR iR DGI C R I i n =+ − =
  
 
Let  iR U  be the utility of the individual working  iR h  in the formal market and let Z be a 
vector of socio-demographic characteristics. The random error  iR ε  is assumed to be 
extreme value i.i.d with zero mean and constant variance. Then we have that: 
 
(2)     (,, ) ;1 , 2 , . . . , iR iR iR iR Uu D h Z i n ε =+ =  
where u(.) is the deterministic part of the utility function and  iR ε  is the random part.  
Let  R S denote the excepted value of the maximum utility function. As demonstrated by 
Ben-Akiva and Lehrman (1979) the expected value of utility can be given as following: 
 
(3)     1,2,.., 2
1 2
(max ) ln exp( )
n
kR







== ∑   
Where  2 µ  is a constant reflecting the unobserved heterogeneity in labour supply 
preferences meaning that larger are the values more uncertain are the preferences. As a 
result the conditional probability of choosing  iR h under the choice of being a regular 
worker, is given as: 
 
(4)     1,2,.., (| ) ( m a x ) iR iR k n kR Ph R PU U = ==  
Under the assumption of the random error as extreme value i.i.d, the optimal choice 
probability is a multinomial logit and given as: 
   14





















Stage 2.b. : Labour supply of an irregular worker 
In contrast to an individual working as a regular worker, an individual working in the 
informal labour market doesn’t pay taxes on the labour income. An irregular worker 
chooses to simultaneously to work in the informal labour market and not report its 
participation or the actual hours of work offered in the labour market. Thus under the 
assumption of expected utility maximization the net income of an irregular worker are 
defined as following:  
 
(6)     ; 1,2,..., iIR iIR D RI i n =+ =  
The conditional probability of working  iI h  unregistered hours conditional on being an 
irregular worker, is given by: 
 





















Stage 1: choosing between being regular and irregular worker 
 
The decision made by an individual to be irregular or regular worker depends on the 
expected values of maximized utilities of the respective choices. Let denote P(R) the 
probability of choosing the formal labour market. The probability of choosing to work in 
the informal labour market is then 1- P(R). Following Ben-Akiva (1973), the probability of 
choosing the optimal alternative can be given in terms of expected consumer surpluses as: 
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where  1 µ  is a positive constant which reflects the unobserved heterogeneity of 
preferences in stage one and  2 µ  reflects the unobserved heterogeneity of preferences in 
stage two.  
 
Tax morale and tax evasion opportunities 
  While in high income and developed countries unreported labour income is 
considered as an illegal and punishable action,  in countries as Albania,  even though this 
action is considered as illegal, still the legislation and tax authorities almost have no 
punishing instruments against it.
13 Therefore, it is more realistic to consider tax evasion 
from the “tax morale” viewpoint in this paper. Strøm et. al (2004) and Shima (2006) give 
importance to social norms believing that the propensity of being evader increases with the 
amplification of this phenomenon in the population. They assume that the probability of 
choosing to work in the informal labour market depends on the individual’s perception 
concerning the social acceptability of tax evasion. Instead we believe that as long as tax 
evasion is mostly acceptable in the Albanian society, it’s the tax morale that may affect the 
individual decision to be irregular worker. In this contest, we define tax morale as 
individual’s awareness and willingness to be regular worker or to pay labour taxes under 
the belief of being a factor in the society development (Cummings et al. 2004).   
  Torgler (2003) defines tax morale as the intrinsic motivation to pay taxes or the 
willingness to pay taxes. He says that “contrary to tax evasion, tax morale does not measure 
individuals behaviour, but individuals attitude. It can be seen as the moral obligation to pay 
taxes and the belief in contributing to the society by paying taxes.”  However, the 
“harmful” attitude of individuals towards tax payment  in transition countries has historic 
grounds. During the communism, the most important taxes were the taxes on profit and 
individuals were not aware of taxes or had no perception regarding the tax burden, Torgler 
(2003).    
In this spirit, we proxy the tax morale by a set of variables such as: the individual’s 
trust in local and central government, individual concern for his health and individual 
concern for his job.  
                                                            
13 The legislation foresees the employer punishment in those occasions of unregistered employees to the 
social security system. (“Drejtoria e Përgjithshme e Tatimeve - Legjislacioni tatimor 2008 –Udhëzim Nr. 24 
datë 02.09.2008“Për procedurat tatimore në Republikën e Shqipërisë”)   16
In addition there might be differences in opportunities of working in the informal 
labour market and depending of the working sector as there are jobs that the individuals can 
fully work irregularly and others that such option is almost null. For example working in 
the construction sector compared to the public sector is considered as accommodating to the 
option of working irregularly while in the public sector there is no room for such option. 
The same holds for retail sector. It is easier for women to find a job in the retail sector 
which is one of the sectors where the irregularity prevails as summary statistics has shown.     
Lastly, household characteristics can push individuals to accept irregular jobs. For 
example, higher number of children means more responsibilities within the household and 
tighter liquidity constrains and this makes the individuals more resilient to irregular market. 
Also, migration may affect the decision to accept or not an irregular work. If the household 
receive remittances from other household members (migrants), they may be more resilient 
to work irregularly. To take into consideration the opportunity set of working 
regularly/irregularly we include four dummy variables which refer to working sectors. We 
introduce also three variables to capture the effect of tax morale on the probability of being 
irregular worker. We weight the expected utility values of choosing the irregular work by a 
density function of the variables standing for evasion opportunities and tax morale  ( ) g Z  
and get : 
 

















which can be written as: 
 












































µ =  the nested multinomial logit model equals the multinomial logit or: 
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The likelihood function 
 
Let  IR n  and  R n  be the group of individuals who have answered no and yes to the question 
of whether they are entitled for social security benefits in the current work. The likelihood 
function (the joint a priori probability) then is given as  
 
(13)     ( ) ( ) ,,
RI R
ji R ji I R jn jn LP h R P h I R
∈∈ =Π Π  
 
The unconditional probabilities  ( ) , iR Ph R and  ( ) , iIR Ph I R are given by: 
 
(14)    
( ) ( ) ( )
() () ( )
,|
,|
ji R ji R j
j iIR j iIR j
Ph R Ph R PR
and





The maximization of the likelihood function yields the estimates of the utility function 
parameters  
 
The utility function specification 
   18
The deterministic part of the utility functions is assumed to be a Box Cox  transformation 
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Where  
-  D  is net income 
-  () Th −  refers to  the leisure time 
-  1 X  refers to age 
-  2 X  refers to age squared 
-  3 X  is a dummy equal 1 if the observation is taken from the wave 2008 and 0 from 
the wave 2005 
-  4 X  refers to gender 
-  5 X refers to number of children 
 
Our model specification is a discrete choice between the alternative to evade or 
participate in the regular labour market. Thus we want to estimate a model where the choice 
probability has a binary outcome taking value one if the individual chooses to participate in 
the formal labour market and value zero in case of participation in the informal labour 
market,. One subject related to such specification is that the participation to the informal 
labour market could  result to variables that are truncated and consequently do not follow a 
normal distribution. Thus, the choice probability, can be characterized by a sample that is 
truncated and variables such as disposal income or hour of work of regular versus irregular 
participants in the labour market can be positively skewed (or skewed right). As we see 
from Table 2 (Appendix 1), labour income are positively skewed together with hours.  
In most of the cases the assumption of normal distribution are the basic assumptions 
in a maximization problem. The Box-Cox transformation of the variables is a functional 
specification, which allows converting the variables to follow approximately a normal 
                                                            
14 In cases when the transformation parameter, λ or γ, equal to 0 we attain the logarithmic transformation of 
the data.    19
distribution. Thus λ  and γ  are the exponent coefficients for income and leisure. If they are 
less than one, then the quasi-concavity condition of the utility function is satisfied. The 
utility function takes a linear form if these parameters approach one and a log-linear form if 
they approach zero. The Box-Cox modelling of the utility function as well as the inclusion 
of the weighting of the utility function with an exponential function (g(.)) does not allow to 
use friendly software commands. Therefore, we made use of Maximum Likelihood 
Programming tools to estimate the model.  
The choice set is composed of five alternatives respectively for being a irregular and 
regular worker by specifying the interval of hours of work and sample randomly within this 
interval which has a length of 16 hours and a maximum of 80 weekly hours. The first 
alternative refers to 1-16 and so on until the last alternative 64-80. The actual observed 
hours will be rounded to the closest discrete value. The basic idea can be appropriately 
modified when one observes directly annual hours or weeks worked. Then, for each 
individual remained in Albania we compute the net income by using the taxation rule 
applied as of 2007 for those who have paid taxes. 









-  Z1,   equals 1 if the individual works in the construction sector or zero otherwise,  
-  Z2   equals 1 if the individual works in the manufacturing sector or zero otherwise, 
-   Z3  equals 1 if the individual works in the trade, restaurants and hostelling sector or 
zero otherwise, 
-  Z4  equals 1 if the individual works in the transport and service sector or zero 
otherwise, 
-  Z5  refer to the log of remittances received 
-  Z6   refer to number of children years times multiplied by gender dummy    20
-  Z7  refers to number of children from 0 to 5 years times multiplied by gender 
dummy  
-  Z8 is a categorical variable capturing individual’s trust in local government. It takes 
values from 1 (complete trust) to 5 (not trust at all).
15 
-  Z9  is a categorical variable capturing individual’s trust in central government. It 
takes values from 1 (complete trust) to 5 (not trust at all). 
-  Z10  dummy living in Tirana 
-   Z11  refers to gender dummy 
-  Z12 dummy if the observation is taken from the wave 2008.  
 
 
5.  Estimation results and model prediction 
Table 2 shows that individuals have a strong preference for leisure and income. The 
estimated coefficients of the exponential terms are smaller than 1 satisfying in this way the 
quasi-concavity condition.  The model yields good predictions in terms of labour supply 
and disposal income. In addition, age and number of children do not affect the preference 
for leisure. The positive and significant coefficient related to gender implies that women 
prefer to work less than men. Lastly, there is a higher preference for leisure in 2008 
compared to 2005 or other way said individuals of our sample have worked less in 2008 
than in 2005.  
Table 2: Estimation results 
Variables     Coef.  Std. Err.  t-value    
Utility function                
Income constant  alfa  2,772 0,142 19,55  *** 
Income exponent  gamma  -0,250 0,015  -16,85  *** 
Leisure constant  beta0  10,090 1,816  5,56  *** 
Leisure*coage beta1  -0,149 0,085  -1,75     
Leisure*coage^2 beta2  0,002 0,001  1,47     
Leisure*2008 beta3  1,116 0,352  3,17  *** 
Leisure*gender beta4  3,379 0,505  6,69  *** 
Leisure*cogender*nch beta5  0,201 0,116  1,73     
Leisure exponent  delta  -0,498 0,070  -7,16  *** 
Opportunity density                
                                                            
15 The use of variable “trust in government” in the analysis is justified by the findings of Wintrobe(2001) 
which argues that the distrust of the individuals toward the government makes individuals more inclined to 
not pay taxes. Moreover if the individuals perceive that the tax evasion is a phenomenon accepted in the 
society they will also tend to apply the same behavior as those who evade.   21
constant g0  -1,636 0,152  -10,77  *** 
construction g1  1,872 0,092 20,37  *** 
manufacture g2  1,492 0,094 15,95  *** 
trade+hoteling g3  3,275 0,114 28,61  *** 
transport+services g4  1,502 0,097 15,43  *** 
log(remitance) g5  0,012 0,009  1,39     
nch*gender g6  -0,051 0,065  -0,79     
nch_05*gender g7  0,032 0,029  1,1     
trust in local government  g8  0,081 0,034  2,4  * 
trust in central government  g9  0,115 0,033  3,44  ** 
Tirana g10  -0,036 0,070  -0,51     
gender g11  -0,685 0,076  -9,02  *** 
year 2008  g12  -0,444 0,083  -5,34  *** 
Log           -9372,5    
Observations           5514    
  
Looking at the evasion decision, Table 2 shows that occupational sectors such as 
construction, manufacturing, trade, hotelling, transport and services shadow more 
irregularity than the others (public sectors, financial sector, health sector etc.). This means 
that it is empirically important to distinguish between working sectors of the economy that 
host the option of tax evasion and the others.  The amount of remittances received from 
relatives or family members doesn’t seem important to  induce people to get involved in 
irregular market. It is worthy to notice that the coefficient related to gender is significantly 
negative meaning that the participation, in the regular labor market with respect to the 
irregular one, is more widespread among men compared to women. These findings are in 
line with other studies which have shown that in Albania women compared to men tend to 
evade taxes less frequently and in case of occurrence the amount is lower, (Gerxhani 2004, 
2006). Also, Gerxhani (2006) explains the gender difference apart personal characteristics 
differences by sector of employment mattered. In the Albanian case the gender segregation 
in the working sectors is such that most of men bread winners are allocated to the private 
sector and in their own businesses, while in contrary women are mostly positioned in the 
public sector. Working in the public sector and under a labor contract compared to those 
working in the private sector and without a labor contract, is less likely to evade personal 
income and insurance taxes. Thus the gender segregation as above provides more 
opportunities to evade taxes for man compared to women.  
As regards the children, it appears that more children the women have more they 
evade while the opposite holds in case the children are younger than 5 years.  The perceived   22
trust in the central government has a positive effect on the value of tax morale and a 
negative one on the evasion probability. Nevertheless, the trust in local government doesn’t 
seem important for the evasion decision. Finally, people have evaded less in 2008 
compared to 2005.    
As the Table 2 shows, after having controlled for the occupational sector, education, 
family composition, the impact of migration, trust in government and what may be more 
important after having accounted for the simultaneous decision of labour supply and 
irregular work, there is a clear tendency to contribute less in the irregular market in 2008 
compared to 2005. In the following section we try to explain the decrease incurred by 
irregular market in 2008 versus 2055 through changes in wage rates and tax progressivity. 
In this way we can understand whether it is the implementation of the flat tax that brings to 
informality reduction or other factors have helped it as well.  
 
6.  Predicted labour  supply under the current tax system 
Once we attain the estimation results, they can be used to calculate and predict the 
expected labor supply from the conditional probabilities of being regular or irregular 
worker combined with individual characteristics and actual rules of the tax system.  
 
Table 3: Model prediction as of current tax system  









worker  All 
P(IR)  0,359 0,620 0,486 0,325 0,582 0,438
P(R)  0,641 0,380 0,514 0,675 0,418 0,562
Hours  44,09 45,67 44,86 42,39 44,85 43,46
Disp  30614 25839 28292 31518 23600 28052
Tax 
revenues  10330 9438 9896 11210 6738 9252
 
The columns 3 and 6 of the Table 3 say that the model predicts very well the observed data 
(the predicted share of evaders is very close to the observed share of evaders for both 2005 
and 2008 waves, 48% and 43%). Furthermore, the last row of the Table 3 refers to the tax 
revenues collected by the government and is calculated as the sum of direct taxes (taxes and 
social insurance contributions) and indirect taxes (VAT, 20% of net individual income). 
The summary statistics (Table 1) and the estimated results of conditional logit indicate a 
10% reduction in labour informality from 48% to 43% during the period 2005-2008. These   23
years have been characterized by a decline in tax progressivity, an increase in the regular 
wages and a decrease in the irregular wages as well. Such changes may have rendered less 
attractive the option of working in the informal market. Also, the conditional logit shows 
that social norms and opportunities to work in the irregular sector affect the individual 
perception of labour informality.  To single out the impact of the tax change from that of 
wage change we proceed as follows: 1) we simulate a tax regime swap to figure out the 
impact of tax change per se and 2) we calculate the participation elasticities with respect to 
a 10% increase in the wages to discern the impact of wages. The estimated parameters of 
the conditional logit are used to simulate the changes in tax regimes and wages as shown in 
the Appendix 3. 
 
7.  Separating tax change effect from wage change  
 
 Predicted elasticities 
In overall, labour supply elasticties are high. More specifically, Table 4 shows that an 
increase by 10% in overall wage rates implies: 
a.  an increase (decrease) in the supply of regular (irregular) labour. This 
increase in regular labour supply is higher for irregular workers than regular 
workers while the decreases in irregular labour participation are higher 
among regular workers.  
b.  In addition, a 10% increase in only regular wage rates results in an increase 
of regular labour supply and a decrease of irregular market. On the other 
hand, an increase in irregular wage rates has an opposite effect. The 
participation elasticties with respect to increases in regular/irregular wages 
are significantly higher than those with respect to overall wages. Here we 
have to recall that there was an increase in regular wages and a decrease 
decrease in irregular wages during the period 2005-2008. Also this fact may 
partly explain the reduction in informality in 2008 (from 48% in 2005 to 
43% in 2008). 
 
 
Table 4:  Mean value of elasticity of labour supply with respect to an increase  
 
      2005  2008   24











                    
   Hours  -0,08 -0,07  -
0,07 
-0,07 -0,07  -0,07 
   P(IR)  -0,31 -0,20  -
0,25 
-0,30 -0,18  -0,25 
   P(R)  0,17 0,33  0,24  0,14 0,26  0,19 
Regular  
wages 
                    
   Hours  -0,06 -0,03  -
0,04 
-0,05 -0,04  -0,05 
   P(IR)  -2,44 -1,64  -
2,05 
-2,45 -1,80  -2,17 
   P(R)  1,45 2,98  2,19  1,30 2,78  1,94 
Irregular  
wages 
                    
   Hours  -0,03 -0,05  -
0,04 
-0,02 -0,04  -0,03 
   P(IR)  2,59 1,47  2,05  2,62 1,65  2,20 
   P(R)  -1,29 -2,21  -
1,74 
-1,17 -2,17  -1,61 
 
 
Simulation of Tax Regime Swap in 2005 and 2008 
 
The expected labor supply response and level of tax evasion is investigated both at 
intensive (change in hours of work) and extensive margin ( change in participation 
decision). Through this attempt it is possible to analyze the costs of transition, from 
progressive to flat tax, in terms of labor supply and tax evasion decision. The government 
has a specific net revenue target from taxes, keeping in mind that it faces also some losses 
through tax evasion. The constraint is that, the transition could be justified under the 
condition of a lower level of evaded taxes, a positive response of expected regular labor 
supply as well as a negative response of expected irregular labor supply.  
Here we test the changes occurred in irregular and regular markets by swapping the 
tax regimes applied in the 2005 and 2008: 
1)  By replacing the former progressive regime (PT) with the latter flat tax one (FT) 
using the 2005 LSMS  
2)  By replacing the latter flat tax (FT) with the former progressive tax (PT) using 
the 2008 LSMS. 
Table 5.1: Simulation of a policy swap in 2005 and 2008 
percentage change from the current system   25
 
   SWAP 2005  SWAP 2008 









P(IR)  8% 4% 5% -9% -4% -6% 
P(R)  -5% -6% -5% 4% 6% 5% 
Hours  -1% 0% -1% 0% 0% 0% 
Disp  -2% -1% -1% 2% 1% 2% 
Tax 
revenues 
-12% -27% -19% -6% -2% -4% 
 
Table 5.2 Policy swap and probabilities of informal work 
 by net income deciles 
Net Income  
deciles 
2005 2008 
Current Flat Current Progressive 
1  52,56% 52,28% 52,78%  53,81% 
2  46,99% 48,15% 51,68%  50,52% 
3  45,41% 47,23% 47,46%  45,35% 
4  46,10% 48,31% 46,20%  43,45% 
5  46,07% 48,62% 46,25%  43,06% 
6  45,65% 49,00% 42,02%  38,41% 
7  47,99% 51,88% 38,74%  34,71% 
8  50,71% 55,15% 40,55%  36,27% 
9  51,71% 56,07% 36,75%  32,86% 
10  53,10% 56,19% 35,28%  32,82% 
Total  48,63% 51,29% 43,77%  41,13% 
 
Table 5.1 shows that the tax regime swap results in: 
1)  A slight increase in the informal labour market participation among both regular and 
irregular workers when implementing the 2008 rule in the 2005 data. Concerning 
labour supply, the replacement of PT in 2005 by the FT and vice versa does not 
have any impact on the expected supply of working hours both for regular and 
irregular workers by less than one hour per week. However we have to consider that 
they previously used to work more than 40 hours per week. 
2)  If we confront the changes incurred due to the replacement of FT regime with PT 
regime in 2008 data with the respective changes when we replace the PT regime 
with FT regime in 2005 data, similar numbers appear but with an opposite sign.  
Nevertheless, both changes result in a drop of tax revenues and an insignificant 
increase in individual net income in case of wave 2005.  
 
To understand the reasons behind such an increase in informality when the flat tax is 
implemented in 2005 data, we look into the informality probabilities across income deciles   26
(Table 5.2). The informal labour participation will increase across all deciles and this is due to the 
fact that almost all the sample will be charged a higher income tax (as the Graph 1. also shows) and 
consequently have a lower level of disposal income. A lower level of net income is quite 
determinant for the utility of individuals and the estimated coefficients of the conditional logit 
strongly supports it.  These results seem at odds with the claims supporting flat tax but it is 
not because the flat tax discussed in the literature presumes lower marginal tax rates at the 
top of distribution and higher marginal rates at the bottom. This is not the case for the flat 
tax applied in Albania. The flat tax of 10 % as it is penalises almost all the sample.  
 
  Graph 1. Collected Taxes by Income deciles 
 
 
This result implies that the question of evasion is not related to the function of the tax rule, 
be it progressive or proportional (called flat) but to the marginal taxes it entails. Therefore, 
singling out the wage effect from the tax effect we find that while the flat tax has a negative 
effect on regular work compared to the previous one, the increase (decrease) in regular 
(irregular) nominal wages may have lead to a reduction of informality in Albania during the 
period 2005-2008.  
 















After applying a swap tax rule and understanding the reasons behind the reduction in labour 
informality (as summary statistics have shown) during the period 2005-2008, next we test 
different policies intended to weaken this phenomenon. OECD (2004) shows that the risk 
of being detected and fined for being employed in the informal labour market are  relatively 
modest in Albania. The lack of auditing and enforcement policies remain crucial for the tax 
revenues the state is supposed to collect. However, policies related to audit rates and 
penalties need to be tested.  
 
Summarizing,  we simulate several fiscal policies such as: 
-  introduce detection probability and tax penalty rates of different magnitude in 
order to quantify the decrease in informality due to the enforcement  
-  introduce public goods access to those who work in the regular market and 
check its effect on the informality 
 
These simulations are meant to investigate the functioning of the tax enforcement system 
and how individuals behave in front of it. One of the limitations of the dataset is that we 
have no information about the attitude of the individuals toward the phenomenon of tax 
evasion. What we know from previous studies is that the detection probabilities are low and 
the fines paid in case of detection are almost null. However, tax evasion is considered to be 
a risky activity, if detected it is penalized by a fine. This implies that in these simulations 
the penalty rate together with the detection probabilities are taken as exogenous. The 
literature widely argues that the level of tax evasion decreases as the penalty rate increases. 
As normal, higher penalty rates lead to more compliance and less regular incomes 
undeclared to the tax authorities. Independently from these conclusions the level of penalty 
rate is an issue of discussion. Playing fair with punishment is not always clear. The penalty 
rate should correspond to the level of evaded taxes. Following Allingham and Sandmo 
(1972) the penalty rate is proportional to the level of income evaded. Apart from the actual 
tax rate there is an additional rate of penalty as a sort of punishment. Sandmo (2004) 
arguments that the evaders consider the tax evasion as optimal when the perception of the 
penalty rate is below the regular tax rate.  
From our model the penalty rate  ) ( jE R π  pursue from an exogenous rate which we 
have taken in an arbitrary way. As long as the individuals and in our case respondents give 
overweight to the probability of not being detected it is interesting to analyze the individual   28
behavior in case of an exogenous penalty rate.  In the formulation below  ) ( jE R π  is going to 
be replaced by a penalty rate taking values in 25% and 50% of undeclared income, and a 
detection probability 25% and 50%. 
 
) ( ) , ( , , jE jE iH jE iH D E ij R I R R T I R R D π − + − + + =  
We start by a penalty rate of 25 percent and a detection probability of 25% (see 
Table 5). Comparing the response rates of the expected labor supply and tax level 
predictions, regular and irregular one, at intensive and extensive margin, attention-grabbing 
results are provided. We find that: 
1)   The probability of being regular (irregular) worker increases (decreases) with 
the increase  of the penalty rate.  indicating also that the probability of evading 
decreases.  
2)  This diminishing effect is stronger in the 2008 data than in 2005 data. This 
means that individuals are more responsive to law enforcement in 2008 than 
2005.   
3)  In addition, if tax revenues collected by the government slightly decrese in 2005 
compared to the current system, they increase in 2008 due to a switch of 
irregular workers to the regular labour market 
Next, we experiment with values of penalties and detection probabilities reaching 
50%. It appears that  (Table 6 and 7) labour informality decreases more when the detection 
probabilities is at 50% and penalty rate at 25% than vice-versa implying that individuals’ 
behaviour toward tax evasion is more affected by law enforcement (compliance and 
auditing) rather than warning but unimplemented high penalty rates. In other words, a 
hypothetical punishment is less effective than a warning for detected. Also, the former 
implies higher tax revenues to the state.  
Table 5: Simulation of detection prob=penalty=0.25 
- percentage change from the current system 
   2005  2008 








All   29
P(IR)  -15% -10% -12% -20% -11% -15% 
P(R)  8% 17% 11% 10% 16% 12% 
Hours  -1% 0% -1% 0% 0% 0% 
Disp  -7% -8% -7% 0% -3% -1% 
Tax 
revenues 
-1% -10% -5% 0% 9% 2% 
 
Table 6: Simulation of detection prob=0.25 and penalty=0.5 
- percentage change from the current system 
   2005  2008 









P(IR)  -28% -20% -23% -29% -18% -23% 
P(R)  16% 33% 22% 14% 25% 18% 
Hours  -1% 0% 0% 0% 1% 0% 
Disp  -8% -12% -10% -2% -6% -3% 
Tax 
revenues 
4% -2% 1% 3% 16% 7% 
 
Table 7: Simulation of detection prob=0.5 and penalty=0.25 
- percentage change from the current system 
   2005  2008 









P(IR)  -37% -27% -31% -31% -19% -24% 
P(R)  21% 45% 29% 15% 26% 18% 
Hours  -1% 0% -1% 0% 0% 0% 
Disp  -10% -14% -12% -2% -6% -4% 
Tax 
revenues 
6% 3% 5% 4% 17% 8% 
 
 
Lastly, we don’t limit our analysis to experiment different penalty and detection 
rates but we test also how individuals behave towards informality when they know that they 
will enjoy other incentives for participating in the formal economy. These incentives may 
take the form of a public good such as a better infrastructure (construction of a new 
highway, a kindergarten), or a more tangible good such as universal benefits (or child care 
services, care for elderly, in-work benefits etc). As Carbonell and Gerxhani (2008) show, 
the public aspect of tax morale (captured by the willingness of people to contribute to 
public goods) may affect positively the public tax morale of the individuals through their 
financial situation. In this spirit, the simulations results (Table 8) reveal a strong reduction 
in tax evasion which is comparable with the most optimistic scenarios with highest 
detection or penalty rates. Yet again, a stronger impact is reached in 2008 than in 2005.     30
 
Table 8: Simulation of public good 
- percentage change from the current system 
   SWAP 2005  SWAP 2008 















P(R)  10,00% 22,22% 14,39% 11,51% 21,96% 14,91% 
Hours  -1,36% -0,84% -1,10% -0,37% -0,15% -0,27% 
Disp  -6,33% -8,30% -7,21% 0,20% -2,77% -0,89% 
Tax 
revenues 




6.  Impact of the reforms on the inequality   
Inequality measurement  
 
In general the reforms in the tax system have different effects on different 
individuals. Therefore for comparison purposes and evaluation of the overall effect of the 
reform we sum the individual effects into a synthetic index. The index that serves to our 
purpose is the one proposed by Sen (1974, 1976), the so-called Sen’s Social Welfare 
function. This index expresses social welfare as the product of an efficiency measure (i.e. 
average income) with an equality measure (1 – Gini coefficient). We denote the index as: 
 
S(D) = Social Welfare (income-based) = Mean (D) * (1 - Gini (D)) 
 
Table 9: Inequality measures 
   20020055 2008 
   Mean 
Income 
Gini Welfare  Mean 
Income 
Gini Welfare 
Current  28292  0,371 17790 28052  0,347 18323 
SWAP  27898  0,375 17448 28599  0,344 18772 
Penalty=Audit 
=0.25 
26189  0,374 16383 27736  0,341 18290 
Penalty=0.5 
Audit=0.25 
25446  0,375 15910 27171  0,340 17946 
Penalty=0.25 
Audit=0.5 
24954  0,374 15625 27045  0,339 17889 
Flat tax & 
Public Good 
26253  0,373 16454 27802  0,340 18350 
   31
 
Table 9 shows the average income, Gini inequality index and the Sen welfare index for 
all simulation scenarios compared to the current tax regime. The first row of the Table says 
that the Gini inequality index based on individual net income is lower in 2008 than in 2005. 
Further more, we find that: 
1)  A swap of tax regime implies a lower inequality index when the progressive tax is 
implemented compared to the flat tax scenario. In addition to that, also the social 
welfare index is higher when we implement the former progressive tax rule. 
2)  Furthermore, the reform which brings to a better distribution in income terms is the 
one based on the provision of a public good for both years.  
3)  After the swap reforms, the public good reform yields the highest Sen’s Welfare 
value measure while the other reforms underlying the penalty and detection policies 
perform worse than the baseline one.  
4)  The flat tax reform do not have a significant impact per se and this is in line with 
Narazani (2008).  
 
To conclude, the Gini inequality index doesn’t not exhibit a significant dynamics but 
seems rather unaffected by the implementation of these reforms.  
 
 7- Conclusions 
 
One of the main concerns, noticeably debated in the literature is the linkage between 
labor supply decision and the central implications of different tax systems with the purpose 
of alleviating the trade off equity – efficiency. The implementation of   non-linear tax 
systems versus flat tax systems is a crucial issue, which requires a special consideration.  
This paper provides empirical evidence on labor supply decisions and the important 
implications as regards the evaluation of tax system reforms in the presence of a 
widespread phenomenon of labour informality. A discrete choice model is used to estimate 
a labour supply model which incorporates the labour informality option.  
We find that the flat tax implemented since July 2007 has not contributed in the 
reduction of labour informality but rather the increases in regular wages have played an 
important role in convincing the individuals to move to regular market. The rationale 
behind this results is related to the higher marginal tax rates the flat tax implies for the   32
whole sample. The flat tax of 10% is certainly the lowest applied in the world but leads to 
higher average taxes than the previous one save the labour income remain unchanged.  
Furthermore, we simulate different tax penalty rates and probability detection 
scenarios and find that controls and audits are more efficient than fines in inducing people 
to switch from the informal to formal labour market. A similar effect is achieved also when 
“honest” individuals are endowed with an universal benefit which made us conclude that 
“carrots” rather than “sticks” may be a better tool in combating labour informality in 
Albania.  
In distributional terms, calculations of Gini inequality index and Sen’s welfare index 
demonstrate that no significant changes occur for all the scenarios we simulated. The 
inequality index is higher in 2005 than in 2008 and this implies a higher social welfare too. 
However, the only scenario that would improve welfare index is a progressive tax rule as 
before 2007.  
These results imply that a kind of progressivity should be back in the taxation rule 
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